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ABSTRACT
Labor unions exert significant power through collective bargaining, pension
fund investing, and political advocacy. But in each of these areas, unions face
inherent structural limitations that severely constrain these powers. Workers
need participation rights in corporate governance to overcome the multiplicity
of forces arrayed against them. And rather than obviating the need for unions,
worker corporate power would facilitate a different kind of labor
representation—a transition to labor power that advocates for occupational
interests and forms coalitions across the shifting political interests of different
worker groups.
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INTRODUCTION
Unions fight for workers. The 1935 Wagner Act created the obligation for
employers to bargain collectively with worker representatives, and by the mid1950s unions represented over one-third of the American workforce.1 Even
today, unions represent 16.4 million workers, and their members average over
$200 more a week in earnings than non-union workers.2 Unions also have a say
in the control of trillions of dollars in pension holdings through public-sector
pension funds and multiemployer funds.3 And in the political sphere, unions are
among the biggest institutional spenders: in 2016, they donated $35 million to
individual federal candidates and $132 million to super-political action
committees.4 No other organizations or institutions come close to matching the
power of unions when it comes to advocating on behalf of workers.
At the same time, organized labor is now at its weakest—and the future seems
bleak.5 Unions represent only 6.4% of all private-sector employees, a percentage
which has continuously declined from its 1950s heyday.6 Corporate law in the
United States has effectively removed workers from the governance of firms and
given complete power to shareholders and C-suite management.7 Employee
1
MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10 tbl.1
(1987) (illustrating that between 1950 and 1960 union membership was between 31.5% and
34.7% of nonagricultural workers); LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION SOURCEBOOK:
MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE, FINANCE DIRECTORY app. A at A-1 (1985) (illustrating that 32.5%
of nonagricultural employment was unionized in 1953).
2
Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Union
Member Summary (Jan. 18, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2
.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/C4YU-8X95] (“Among full-time wage and salary workers, union
members had median usual weekly earnings of $1,051 in 2018, while those who were not
union members had median weekly earnings of $860.”).
3
See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST
BEST WEAPON, at xii (2018) (putting the valuation of worker pension funds at $3-6 trillion).
4
Dave Jamieson & Paul Blumenthal, Labor Unions Spent a Record Amount on the
Elections. But Not as Much as These 5 People., HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 4:52 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/labor-union-election2016_us_58223b92e4b0e80b02cd7259 [https://perma.cc/LVU4-3EJW]. Unions were five of
the top fifteen organizational contributors to political campaigns in the 2016 election cycle.
Top Organization Contributors, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/
list.php?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/EX8E-ZSWE] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
5
See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1528 (2002) (“The labor laws have failed to deliver an effective mechanism of
workplace representation, and have become nearly irrelevant, to the vast majority of private
sector American workers.”); see also KATE ANDRIAS & BRISHEN ROGERS, REBUILDING
WORKER VOICE IN TODAY’S ECONOMY 5 (2018), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Rebuilding-Worker-Voices-final-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HN45D6ZR] (“The precipitous decline of labor unions over the last few decades has had devastating
consequences for American workers.”).
6
See Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 2.
7
Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (“[I]n the course of the twentieth century, legal scholars
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pensions have shifted from primarily defined-benefit plans to definedcontribution plans, which remove unions from the management of these funds.8
And changes to state, federal, and constitutional law have made it more difficult
for unions to collect funds from the workers they represent, especially when such
funds are earmarked for political advocacy.9 Meanwhile, fueled at least in part
by labor’s decline, income inequality continues to widen. Workers’ wages have
remained largely stagnant, while executive compensation and corporate profits
climb higher. Rather than going into workers’ pockets, the vast majority of the
2018 corporate tax cuts were plowed into stock buybacks.10
There are indications that, at long last, our New-Deal-era system of employee
empowerment is primed for a redesign. The key is corporate power. Rather than
remaining siloed outside of corporate governance, workers need a voice in the
boardroom to provide a say in the management and control of the firm. Although
such an approach has long been anathema to U.S. corporate law, recent
developments have opened the door for a discussion of worker representation on
corporate boards. Recent bills proposed by Senators Tammy Baldwin and
Elizabeth Warren would provide workers with representation on the board of
directors.11 New managerial methodologies providing for participatory
management and employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe.12
and political theorists helped remove the interests of workers (as differentiated from
shareholders, officers, and directors) from the core concerns of corporate law and theory.”).
8
In 1981, 64.2% of all pension plan participants were in defined-benefit plans; that
percentage declined to 27.7% in 2015. See EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS: 1975-2016, at 5 (2018),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/researchers/statistics/retirementbulletins/private-pension-plan-bulletin-historical-tables-and-graphs.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5
HX-ZMZQ].
9
See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2449 (2018)
(eliminating responsibility of represented public-sector employees to pay union dues);
Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox
v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1029-47 (2013) (discussing First
Amendment rights of unions and dissenting union members).
10
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Tax Cuts Provide Limited Boost to Workers’ Wages, WALL STREET
J. (Oct. 2, 2018, 7:35 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-cuts-provide-limited-boost-toworkers-wages-1538472600 (“U.S. companies are putting savings from the corporate tax cut
to use, but only a fraction of it is flowing to employees’ wallets, new data show.”); Ben
Popken, What Did Corporate America Do with That Tax Break? Buy Record Amounts of Its
Own Stock, NBC NEWS (June 26, 2018, 3:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/
economy/what-did-corporate-america-do-tax-break-buy-record-amounts-n886621
[https://perma.cc/9E6Q-9GQP].
11
Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018); Reward Work Act, S.
2605, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018).
12
See, e.g., FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING
ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 55-61 (2014)
(introducing “Teal Organizations” as new structure of organization that emphasizes “selfmanagement,” “wholeness,” and “evolutionary purpose”); BRIAN J. ROBERTSON,
HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD 16-26
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The Walkout for Change by Google workers demanded the appointment of an
employee representative to Google’s board.13
Efforts at economic reforms to support worker power need organized labor’s
support and advocacy. But unions face a set of competing interests that make
any move towards employee corporate power more complicated. This potential
for dissonance is similar to the conflicts faced by union and public pension funds
in their management of labor’s capital. In both situations, unions have both
convergence and divergence with the interests of the workers they represent. Of
course, conflicts of interest are endemic to capitalism, and the current regulatory
structure exacerbates the conflicts within labor interests. But these conflicts must
also be recognized—and, to the extent possible, managed or ameliorated.
Part I of this Article will provide a brief taxonomy of labor interests and will
discuss the possibility for conflicts within those interests in three distinct areas:
collective bargaining, pension fund management, and political advocacy. Part II
will discuss the effects of labor interests on labor, employment, and corporate
law and policy, as well as efforts at reform in these areas. Part III will discuss
the potential role for unions in reshaping the economic landscape to provide
workers with greater voice and power within corporate governance while
remaining their representatives and advocates. Even in a dramatically changed
corporate governance landscape, labor would retain its vital role in representing
worker interests on the shop floor, in boardrooms, in legislatures, and in
courtrooms.
I.

LABOR INTERESTS

Unions are often imagined as the pure distillation of employee sentiment and
desires—the American worker in institutional form. However, like all
institutional actors, unions face conflicts of interest in each of the settings in
which they operate. Some of these conflicts are subtle, but they take on
heightened importance when considering potential workplace reforms that
might change their role. The following is a brief taxonomy of labor’s interests
within their various spheres of influence and the potential for conflicts among
these interests.
A.

Collective Bargaining Representation

The most critical role for unions remains serving as the collective bargaining
representative for workers who have chosen union representation. This role is
established under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which requires
employers to bargain with labor organizations when a majority of the workers

(2015) (describing “holacracy,” new paradigm of organization which distributes authority to
all individuals in organization).
13
Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-employeewalkout-labor.html.
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in a particular bargaining unit have selected that representative.14 Although an
employer has no obligation to reach an agreement with the union, it must
continue to bargain in good faith until impasse.15 Unions also have certain
protections, such as prohibitions on retaliation as well as a limited right to strike
and engage in collective action, that enable them to exercise negotiating power.16
The NLRA envisions collective bargaining as the framework for labormanagement relations and unions as the employees’ agents within that
framework.
In any agency relationship, there will be divergence between the interests of
the principal and the interests of the agent. It is important to recognize that union
representation is, at root, an agency relationship. A representation election is a
decision to purchase group representation services.17 Employees agree to pay
the union in return for the services that the union provides. By electing the union
as their representative, employees essentially designate the union as their
representative in exchange for the payment of dues. An economically rational
decision to choose union representation would be based on whether the
employee expects that the union will, in fact, improve terms and conditions.18
And the appeal of unions is their ability to get more for employees than the
employees would get on their own.
Unions have a set of collective bargaining interests that converge and diverge
from the interests of their employee members. As agents, unions are interested
in getting the best deal for their employees under a collective bargaining
agreement. However, like many agents, their interest in securing a given deal is
likely stronger than their interest in fighting for the best possible deal. And the
structure of the deals that unions negotiate is worth particular consideration.
Collective bargaining agreements must cover the entire bargaining unit. As part
of that agreement, unions generally demand a dues check-off provision whereby
worker dues are automatically deducted from the employees’ paycheck.19 Dues
14

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (2012).
Id. § 158(d).
16
See, e.g., id. § 158(a)(1), (3), (4), (b)(4)(i).
17
Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1, 35 (2008).
18
Or, put more precisely, “[i]f the expected utility from [the employees’] job becoming a
union job is higher than from it not becoming a union job, then they will vote for the union.”
Henry S. Farber & Daniel H. Saks, Why Workers Want Unions: The Role of Relative Wages
and Job Characteristics, 88 J. POL. ECON. 349, 351 (1980). Of course, different employees
will have different perspectives on the potential costs and benefits of unionization. See id. at
367 (noting that individual employees vote for or against unionization “as if the effect of
unionization on earnings is to raise average earnings and lower its dispersion”).
19
In right-to-work states, employees can forego any payment to the union despite the
union’s required representation, while in non-right-to-work states, a collective bargaining
agreement can require all represented employees to pay that portion of the union dues that
covers collective bargaining services. In Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735 (1988), the Supreme Court differentiated between components of the dues and ruled
that nonmembers need not pay the union for services that are not directly related to collective
15
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are the primary source of funds for unions, and the primary—and to some extent
the only sustainable—way to secure them is through a collective bargaining
agreement with a union security clause.
The need for dues sets up an obvious divergence between workers and unions.
Like customers of any service, workers will want to pay as little as possible for
union representation, while unions will want to charge higher rates. To some
extent this conflict is ameliorated through regulation. Unions are almost always
nonprofit associations due to antitrust, tax, and labor law.20 Under the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), a union must give its
members “equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate
candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to
attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting
upon the business of such meetings . . . .”21 Dues can only be increased through
a vote by the majority of the membership.22 The LMRDA also imposes strict
fiduciary duties on union officers and employees in carrying out their
responsibilities on behalf of the members.23 At the same time, unions are
independent institutions with their own sets of internal procedures, leadership,
and employees. They generally have complete discretion in handling
negotiations with employers. A union may even execute a collective bargaining
agreement without any approval by the represented employees.24 The union is
the employees’ representative; it is not a representation of them.
Unions have engaged in a variety of worker-empowerment initiatives that
help nonunionized workers, from efforts for guaranteed overtime pay during the
New Deal up through the Fight for $15 for fast-food workers.25 But only dues
secured through collective bargaining pay the bills. Unions are creatures of the
NLRA and LMRDA—these statutes created the market for union representation,
and they establish the parameters for it. These parameters include not only the
bargaining services. Id. at 762-63 (holding that the NLRA “authorizes the exaction of only
those fees and dues necessary to ‘performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the
employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues’” (quoting Ellis v. Bhd.
of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station, 466 U.S. 435, 448
(1984)).
20
See Bodie, supra note 17, at 40. The Clayton Act provides antitrust exemption for those
labor organizations “instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock
or conducted for profit . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). And nonprofit status affords tax benefits.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5) (2012). For an argument for greater flexibility in union organizational
design, see Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
501, 516.
21
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (2012).
22
Id. § 411(a)(3).
23
Id. § 501(a) (requiring, inter alia, that union agents “hold [the union’s] money and
property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and
expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the
governing bodies adopted thereunder”).
24
See Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 810 (1984).
25
Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 47-51 (2016).
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restrictions discussed above, but also the limitations on collective bargaining
imposed under federal law. Employers need to bargain only about terms and
conditions of employment; they need not discuss product development,
corporate governance, or other areas within the “core of entrepreneurial
control.”26 Collective bargaining in its design requires a divide between labor
and management. Innovative forms of participatory management are
unattractive to unions when such forms blur this division.
Unions also have an interest in representing a broad category of workers
across firms. They seek to take wages out of competition by securing
representation for all of the workers in a relevant labor market.27 The larger
percentage of workers that the union represents, the more market power the
union has.28 And this market power will of course inure to the advantage of
individual represented workers. However, this solidarity also means that
workers will be tied together across firms, deemphasizing their allegiance to
their individual firms. In other words, unions have an interest in the economic
fortunes of a group of workers across firms as a unit, whereas individual workers
have an interest not only in their unionized cohort, but also in their individual
firm. A union has strong incentives not to negotiate a deal for workers at one
firm that would be better for represented workers at a competing firm—the union
wants all of its members to have the same deal. Recent pro-union labor law
reforms have suggested getting unions out of bargaining at the enterprise/firm
level entirely, and instead putting in place sectoral bargaining at the local, state,
or even national level.29
The tension between in-group and out-group workers can also manifest itself
between unions and their members. The AFL-CIO has enjoyed remarkable
success in coalescing the labor movement into one collective group that pushes
a pro-labor agenda, but even this success has had hiccups.30 The idea of a “labor
movement” by necessity must downplay the inherent tensions between the
different types of represented workers. Workers within the same industry are
competing directly against each other within their firms; increased market share
at one firm will decrease the share of the others. Workers in different industries
may compete as substitutes for one another. And higher pay for workers will
lead to increased costs for consumers—who are, after all, generally workers
themselves. Moreover, unions may at times compete within firms as different
sets of workers try to improve their terms and conditions of employment. The

26

SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, LABOR LAW 134-39 (2016).
ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 60 (1962) (“Unions in highly
competitive industries . . . will almost always pursue a standard wage policy within a given
product market.”).
28
See DAVID ROLF, CENTURY FOUND., A ROADMAP TO REBUILDING UNION POWER 37-42
(2018).
29
ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 26-33.
30
In 2005 several unions broke out of the AFL-CIO and the former “Change to Win”
coalition. See Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 30, 2005, at 38.
27
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airline industry, for example, has three primary sets of unionized workers: flight
attendants, machinists, and pilots. Although these workers all share common
cause against management and shareholders, they are also competing against
each other for a larger share of wages.31 Private-sector workers see their taxes
go to pay for public services provided by workers who are unionized at a
significantly higher rate. Ultimately, the notion that “American workers” have a
monolithic set of interests is belied by the many ways in which such workers
and their industries are caught in capitalism’s eternal competition. And unions,
as the representatives for a particular group of workers, will find themselves
caught at times between the shifting sets of economic allies and adversaries for
that particular group.
B.

Pension Fund Management

Labor unions play an important role in the management of certain pension
funds. On the private-sector side, union representatives serve as fiduciaries for
pension plans provided through union funds as well as multiemployer plans.32
These pensions are generally defined-benefit plans, which means that the plan
is responsible for paying retirees a fixed stipend for the remainder of the
employee’s life.33 The plan must manage the funds so as to ensure that the plan
can pay for the retiree benefits that come due. As a result, defined-benefit plans
must carefully manage the contributions to the plan to make sure that they match
up with the plan’s future obligations. In the public sector, unions similarly play
a role in managing the funds of government-provided, defined-benefit plans.
Although the plans are government entities, their managerial structures
generally include representatives for the unions whose members receive the
pensions.34 In contrast, unions do not manage defined-contribution plans, which
provide individual employee accounts into which the employer and the
employee contribute set amounts. These accounts, generally managed through a
private institution such as a mutual fund company, are controlled by the
individual employee and provide no assurance that sufficient funds will be
available upon retirement.

31
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Employee Ownership and Unions: Lessons from the Airline
Industry, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE:
ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 573, 577-78 (Samuel Estreicher
ed., 1998) (discussing power of pilots’ union).
32
Plans administered by unions alone were common prior to the Taft-Hartley Act. Ewan
McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate
Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 24),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3246974. Fearful of consolidated union power in pensions,
Congress prohibited employers from funding union-managed plans, instead requiring
pensions to be jointly managed by management and labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2012);
COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 4-5 (5th ed. 2018).
33
MEDILL, supra note 32, at 129-30.
34
WEBBER, supra note 3, at xiv-xv.
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The incentives of union pension-fund representatives are aligned with the
interests of their beneficiaries in that both want to see the fund sufficiently
funded to pay future benefits. A union will often represent current employees as
well as retirees, and its current members would lose faith if promises to retirees
were not kept. But to the extent there is discretion in assuring that current
investment strategies meet future demand, unions have an interest in pursuing
investments that at the least do not harm the economic interests of their current
members. To this extent, union interests may diverge from those of the
beneficiaries, who may care only about maximizing the probability of receiving
their defined benefit by maximizing the funds in the plan.
Another potential for divergence has captured the imaginations of a
significant segment of corporate law scholars, as well as one court.35 They fear
that unions and state and local governments may have nonshareholder interests,
such as more jobs or higher wages, that outweigh their common interests with
other shareholders.36 Because of their “special” interests, union and publicsector pension funds may “pursue self-interested objectives rather than the goal
of maximizing shareholder value.”37 However, union members could make a
similar charge against union pension fund managers who do not take union
interests into account. The money collected for these funds came from union
workers, and it would be unfair for the plan to turn its back on the concerns of
members who are still working their way through the system. As Professor
David Webber has persuasively argued, union and public-sector pension fund
managers have at least some obligation to all of their constituents to pursue
policies that benefit the organization and its movement.38 But this divergence in
35
See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding that the SEC “acted arbitrarily and capriciously” by not evaluating costs potentially
imposed upon companies from shareholders representing special interests, such as union and
government pension funds, based on an Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule
that required public companies to provide shareholders with information about, and the ability
to vote for, shareholder-nominated candidates for the board of directors); STEPHEN
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2008)
(“Public employee pension funds are vulnerable to being used as a vehicle for advancing
political/social goals of the fund trustees that are unrelated to shareholder interests
generally.”); Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics,
Economics, and Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 378-83 (2010) (singling out labor unions and public
pension funds as special-interest shareholders); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s
Vote and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30
(2012) (“[D]ecisionmakers at the SEC may indeed see agenda-driven activists . . . as having
pernicious and costly side-agendas, but see these costs as more than offset if access improves
the accountability of managers and boards. Or, less charitably, decisionmakers at the SEC
may simply be captured by these Washington-savvy interests.”); Roberta Romano, Less is
More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate
Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 231-32 (2001) (arguing that union and public pension
fund managers use shareholder proposals to accrue “private benefits”).
36
Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151-52.
37
Id. at 1152.
38
WEBBER, supra note 3, at 254.
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economic interests between shareholders, pension funds, and union members
remains a recognized and persistent potential conflict.
C.

Political Advocacy

Unions have developed into political actors that operate beyond the specific
concerns of the workers they directly represent. For example, unions have come
out in force to fight against right-to-work laws, most recently undoing Missouri
legislation through a voter referendum.39 In theory, protection for fair-share
union dues disadvantages individual workers by taking away their choice to pay
dues or not. Protection for required collective-bargaining fees favors unions as
institutions, rather than unions as agents for workers. Similarly, the Employee
Free Choice Act, which came closest to passage in 2009-2010, provided for
recognition through card-check and neutrality agreements that made it easier for
unions to organize.40 Certain aspects of union advocacy necessarily focus on
unions as institutions rather than the workers they represent.
Perhaps counterintuitively, there are also numerous instances of unions acting
against their short-term political and economic interests to support political
causes that help workers generally. Unions have consistently supported
“mandatory minimums” in the form of minimum-wage laws, overtime
protections, occupational safety regulations, health and pension benefits, and
protected employee leave.41 In all of these instances, the labor movement
supported mandatory minimums that benefit all workers—not just those in
unions. With each improvement in employment law, the need for individual
workers to unionize weakened. But nevertheless unions pursued these reforms.42
Unions also enter into coalitions that may not always align with the spectrum
of views held by individual members. Union political spending has primarily
39
Kris Maher, Missouri Overturns ‘Right-to-Work’ Law in Referendum, WALL STREET J.
(Aug. 8, 2018, 12:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/missouri-overturns-right-to-worklaw-in-referendum-1533699871.
40
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (amending
National Labor Relations Act to expedite process of choosing representative for group of
employees by immediately certifying the representative if no previous representative existed);
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (same). However, that
legislation also included the boosting of damages paid to individual employees, as well as
required interest arbitration for failed first-contract negotiations. H.R. 1409 §§ 3-4
(facilitating initial collective bargaining agreements and strengthening enforcement against
unfair labor practices); S. 560 §§ 3-4 (same).
41
See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective
Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148, 170-71 (2013).
42
As a counterexample that illustrates the union interests, a union official in Los Angeles
initially argued that union workplaces should be exempt from a proposed minimum wage law
so as to allow the unions more flexibility to bargain for higher benefits in lieu of the wage
increase. Jana Kasperkevic, LA Unions Call for Exemption from $15 Minimum Wage They
Fought for, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/apr/12/los-angeles-15-dollar-minimum-wage-unions [https://perma.cc/T5CT-W5
BF].
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gone to Democratic candidates.43 Even if they like their union, some members
likely have other political preferences that align more with Republicans, such as
lower taxes, pro-life policies, or opposition to gay marriage. These preferences
might be more important to an individual member than the candidates’ positions
on labor. But unions are generally single-issue political actors and align their
political activity with the party or coalition that best represents those interests.
As a result, there may be dissonance between a union’s political support and the
political preferences of individual union members.44
II.

LABOR STRUGGLES

The past fifty years have been difficult for labor. Unions have faced obstacles
in all three of their areas of engagement: collective bargaining, pension fund
activism, and political advocacy. These troubles point to the need for a new
direction in worker empowerment—a direction that leads through corporate
governance, rather than collective bargaining.
A.

The Limitations of Collective Bargaining

Collective bargaining is the raison d’etre of unions. Under the NLRA,
employees can select a collective representative to negotiate terms and
conditions of employment, and the employer must bargain with this
representative in good faith.45 The employer need not agree to any specific set
of terms, but it must bargain in good faith and abide by the complex legal system
for managing this bargaining relationship.46 The duty to bargain forces
employers to come to the table and has had a demonstrable effect on employee
fortunes. Although the exact economic ramifications are contested, there is a
consensus that collective bargaining increases wages among employees on an
individual-firm level.47

43
Top Organization Contributors, supra note 4 (noting that 90% of union campaign
contributions in 2016 went to Democrats).
44
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Opinion, What Unions Got Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2016, at SR2 (noting that in the 2016 presidential election, Clinton received only narrowly
more support from voters in union households, despite receiving bulk of union political
spending on presidential race).
45
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d), 159(a)-(b) (2012) (setting forth duty to bargain and
establishing process to select employees’ collective representative).
46
Id. § 158(d).
47
See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 43-60 (1984)
(discussing studies of union wage effect); David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect
Do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, 25 J. LAB.
RES. 383, 391 (2004) (finding 17% private-sector union wage effect and 14.5% public-sector
union wage effect in late 1990s).
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Unions were able to change the income-distribution dynamics in the midtwentieth century by economic force.48 They collectivized employees
throughout important industries such as auto-manufacturing, truck driving, and
steel production, and they used strikes and other forms of economic pressure to
push up the employees’ wages and benefits.49 However, collective bargaining is
no longer a vehicle for anything more than a small percentage of workers to
interact and bargain with management. The percentage of unionized privatesector employees has been steadily shrinking since its 1950s heyday, from a high
of about 35% to the current 6.4%.50 And there is not much chance of that trend
reversing. The failure of labor-friendly legislation to pass during the first Obama
Administration, when Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, indicates
the improbability of pro-union statutory change.51 Indeed, the recent political
climate has seen erosion in union membership, as states such as Michigan and
Wisconsin become right-to-work states and also make it more difficult for
public-sector workers to organize.52
Moreover, there is a larger structural problem with labor law. The NLRA
clearly creates zones of power and influence that exist outside the internal
business organizational structure. Employers are only required to bargain on
specific topics that could be considered “mandatory” subjects of bargaining.53
Mandatory subjects are limited primarily to the terms of the employment
contract; management has no duty to negotiate over issues such as product
development, executive compensation, financial structuring, and firm

48

See Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, The Cost of a Decline in Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2015, at A25 (describing how unions have been integral to maintaining middle class and
suggesting that decline in unions has led to income inequality).
49
See JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 1-2 (2014) (describing how unions
were “the core equalizing institution” for income equality).
50
Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 2 (observing that 6.4%
of private-sector workers are members of unions in 2018); see also TIMOTHY NOAH, THE
GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO
ABOUT IT 128 (2012) (discussing decline in union membership).
51
See Harold Meyerson, Opinion, Under Obama, Labor Should Have Made More
Progress, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020902465.html (discussing failure of Employee
Free Choice Act).
52
See Monica Davey, Unions Suffer Latest Setback in Midwest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2015, at A1 (discussing how Democratic Party and Republican Party view right-to-work
legislation). This leaves out the policy changes that are making public-sector union
membership more difficult and less desirable. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin
Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 293-94 (2012)
(describing Wisconsin’s “unprecedented attack on public-sector bargaining”).
53
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (discussing
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining).
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governance.54 The idea that the “core of entrepreneurial control”55 is reserved to
the employer itself is central to the federal system of collective bargaining.
Employers may be forced to talk with unions about wages and benefits, but they
have no duty to talk about how they run the business.56 In creating these divided
fields of engagement, the NLRA fenced employees and their representatives out
of any real participation in the firm’s management.57
Labor law scholars and advocates have proposed idea upon idea, program
after program, to revitalize and resurrect union membership.58 One current
reform agenda focuses on the importance of sectoral bargaining and the potential
for new legal frameworks that would foster a sectoral approach.59 I am hopeful
that this new wave of reform, championed by academics and labor leaders, will
stick. However, any effort to reconstruct the past history of union representation
would be built upon a collective-bargaining structure that would retain its
inherent weaknesses, with unions and their represented members separated from
the seat of true power within their companies.
B.

The Inefficacy of Pension Fund Activism

Partisans on both sides agree on the power of union pension funds. Supporters
of the funds believe this power is exercised primarily to salutary effect, whereas
critics claim that pension fund activism causes a variety of distortions and
contortions in corporate governance. In reality, union and public-sector pension
funds have been important advocates for shareholder democracy and have not

54

See id. (emphasizing party’s freedom to bargain or not bargain over other subjects).
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (discussing mandatory subjects’ limitations, including how managerial decisions
lie outside scope of mandatory subjects); see also James Gray Pope, Class Conflicts of Law
II: Solidarity, Entrepreneurship, and the Deep Agenda of the Obama NLRB, 57 BUFF. L. REV.
653, 658 (2009) (“The doctrine [of entrepreneurial control] provides the focal point for a
coherent and positive conception of employer interests that has come to permeate the labor
law.”).
56
See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 223 (explaining how every decision
made that may affect job security does not trigger mandatory bargaining).
57
See Edward Silver & Joan McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act at the
Crossroads, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 181, 187 (1987) (explaining criticisms of the NLRA and
NLRB, including that the NLRA provides inadequate protection against management).
58
To name just a few of the books, see, for example, ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE
WORKERS’ LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 2-15 (2006); CYNTHIA
ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 16569 (2010); JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT
269-70 (2010); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 226-27 (1990).
59
ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 26-33 (arguing that sectoral bargaining removes
collective-action problems, is democratic, and can improve working conditions more
effectively than firm-based bargaining); ROLF, supra note 28, at 37-44 (analyzing success of
sectoral bargaining in Europe and suggesting potential success of sectoral bargaining in
United States).
55
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used their power opportunistically. But neither has this activism been all that
successful in increasing the power of the funds or their beneficiaries. Ultimately,
the funds have done more for shareholder-oriented corporate governance than
they have for union workers.
In their 1998 study of corporate governance activity by union pension funds,
Professors Stewart Schwab and Randall Thomas found not “a socialist or
proletarian plot,” but rather “a model for any large institutional investor
attempting to maximize return on capital.”60 Unions had become model
shareholder activists, using their power to drive a message that benefitted their
fellow shareholders. In particular, Schwab and Thomas praised “the innovative
methods unions have developed to get corporations to listen to traditional
shareholder complaints.”61 Pension funds may have been louder—and at times
more effective—than their mutual-fund counterparts, but they were seeking the
same goals. And this approach has remained the pension funds’ playbook for the
last twenty years. Pension-fund managers have been at the forefront in
governance efforts to strengthen shareholder voting rights,62 rein in the power
of the CEO,63 and fight fraud and abuse by insiders.64 These efforts all redound
to the benefit of shareholders as a group.
Despite the rock-solid evidence of pension fund support for shareholder
interests, the bogeyman of unions and pension funds running amok is popular in
a certain segment of corporate law literature.65 These funds have been singled
out for having interests different than other shareholders—namely, interests in
worker rights. One example of this predilection is almost always trotted out in
support of the theory: the 2004 campaign by CalPERS to withhold shareholder
support for certain Safeway directors.66 The campaign allegedly targeted these
directors because of Safeway’s hard-line negotiations with the United Food and
60
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019-20 (1998).
61
Id. at 1022.
62
WEBBER, supra note 3, at 45-78.
63
Id. at 111-51.
64
Id. at 172.
65
One empirical study has found that AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders are more likely to
support director-nominees by the incumbent board once the AFL-CIO no longer represents
workers at a given firm. See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor
Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 187 (2012). The
study focused on the split between the AFL-CIO and the Change to Win coalition of unions,
and examined the behavior of AFL-CIO funds with respect to directors at Change to Win
companies. Id. at 188. Overall, Professor Agrawal found that the AFL-CIO funds voted for
director nominees 65% of the time and a Change to Win union (the Carpenters) voted 75% of
the time, while three different index funds supported the director-nominees 89 to 98% of the
time. Id. at 195 tbl.1. Among other issues, Agrawal assumes that the index funds’ votes reflect
a policy of shareholder wealth maximization. He does not demonstrate why a vote for
incumbent directors equals a vote for shareholder wealth maximization; it could, in fact,
represent the opposite.
66
See Grundfest, supra note 35, at 382-83.
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Commercial Workers (“UFCW”). In the end, however, only 17% of the shares
voted against the directors targeted by CalPERS.67 The CalPERS-Safeway
example has been used over and over to demonstrate the potential for unions and
pension funds to pressure directors into caving to specialized labor demands.68
But the example itself demonstrates the lack of such potential. CalPERS and the
other pension funds involved had legitimate corporate governance concerns to
raise along with their union-oriented concerns; they did not nakedly assert
nonshareholder interests.69 And even if the drive were simply a naked pursuit of
union interests, their exercise of power netted only 17% of the total shareholder
vote, and also led to the ouster of the CalPERS chair who had orchestrated the
campaign.70 The imbroglio was a complete fiasco for CalPERS. It is hardly
evidence that unions and pension funds exercise their ballot-box power to crush
their fellow shareholders.71
In my view, union pension funds have not done enough to push a pro-worker
agenda. There are opportunities for unions to advocate for, as an example,
worker referenda on transformative corporate transactions.72 But getting
67
Id. at 383. Moreover, the directors would have still been reelected, even if a majority
had voted to withhold their votes, because no other candidates were running against them.
68
See, e.g., Agrawal, supra note 65, at 193; Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary
Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1285-86 (2008) (characterizing
CalPERS-Safeway proxy battle as “high profile” example of “ways activist investors can use
their shareholder status to push for favorable treatment in their other dealings with the firm”);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1735, 1755 n.100 (2006) (“In what may be the best known recent example of this
phenomenon, the pension fund of the union representing Safeway workers used its position
as a Safeway shareholder in an attempt to oust the CEO, who had stood up to the union in
collective bargaining negotiations.”); Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the
Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 883 (2010) (“CalPERS’s
activism at Safeway was criticized as resulting from President Sean Harrigan’s personal prounion sympathies.”); John F. Olson, Reflections on a Visit to Leo Strine’s Peaceable Kingdom,
33 J. CORP. L. 73, 76-77 (2007) (“[T]he 2004 Safeway-CalPERS fiasco demonstrates the
conflicts of interest union pension funds may harbor.”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2524-25 (2005) (“The press, or at least the conservative press,
thought that CalPERS was not acting in its beneficiaries’ interest as stockholders, but rather
was motivated by a desire to change Safeway’s labor policy.”).
69
Marc Lifsher, CalPERS to Withhold Votes on Safeway CEO, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004,
at C2 (“CalPERS said it would withhold its votes for Safeway Chairman and Chief Executive
Steven Burd because of a 60% drop in Safeway’s stock since early 2001 that the pension fund
said wiped out $20 billion in market value. CalPERS officials also cited what they described
as conflicts of interest and a lack of responsiveness to shareholder concerns.”).
70
Tom Petruno, Business Applauds Shake-Up at CalPERS, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at
A1.
71
David Webber frames the episode more hopefully in his book. See WEBBER, supra note
3, at 30-31. However, Webber acknowledges that none of the incumbent Safeway directors
lost, Safeway CEO Steven Burd stayed on in his position until 2013, and CalPERS chair Sean
Harrigan was forced out of his position by the end of the year. Id.
72
See generally Matthew T. Bodie, The Case for Employee Referenda on Transformative
Transactions as Shareholder Proposals, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 897 (2010).
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sufficient shareholder support for a worker-oriented agenda would admittedly
be challenging. “Special interest” shareholders have supported reforms that
support overall shareholder value because only items on the shared shareholder
agenda will get majority votes. Efforts by one group of shareholders to elect a
director who would cater to their unique interests would be met with indifference
or hostility from their fellow shareholders. At most, pension funds could
repeatedly force incumbent boards to incur costs in defending themselves—and
then go on to lose.73 Similar to Professor Webber, I am more optimistic that there
might be some narrow ground for pension funds to push for more workerfriendly policies, perhaps through horse-trading with other investor groups.74
But the strategy of shareholder politics remains difficult for pension funds.
Even if union pension funds were successful shareholder advocates for
worker interests, it may already be too late to successfully push a pro-worker
agenda. As noted above, the collective-bargaining relationships that engendered
these funds have been dwindling over time. While the funds can outlast the
representation, at some point the lack of ongoing union representation catches
up with the amount in the funds. In addition, the trend in pensions has been away
from defined-benefit plans towards defined-contribution plans. Defined-benefit
plans provide specified benefits to retirees, generally based on a formula that
includes years of service, while defined-contribution plans put a certain amount
of money into an individual account that the retiree then has access to upon
retirement.75 Over the years, defined-contribution plans, particularly 401(k)
plans, have become a much more popular option for private companies.76
Because individual account holders manage their own accounts in most definedcontribution plans, they wield significantly less power in corporate governance
than do participants in defined-benefit pension funds.77 Defined-benefit plans
still enjoy robust support in the public sector. But these funds have been under
attack from conservative activists like the Koch brothers, who contend that

73

Professor Joseph Grundfest has provided a theory arguing that union and pension fund
shareholders could use SEC Rule 14a-11 as a “megaphone” to get across their message and,
in some cases, secure concessions from sensitive boards. Grundfest, supra note 35, at 378-83.
Grundfest asserts that these shareholders can use the nomination process to gain additional
publicity “at very little cost” and “need not even come close to winning.” Id. at 379. His
parade of horribles includes union-nominated board candidates who want to “limit the export
of jobs to foreign factories, or to close down foreign factories in order to bring manufacturing
jobs back to America,” or candidates who want to “cap all executive salaries at a multiple of
the average hourly wage of the rank and file,” or who want to “comply with emissions
standards that reduce global warming but that place the corporation at a competitive
disadvantage in the marketplace.” Id. at 381.
74
See WEBBER, supra note 3, at 246-50.
75
MEDILL, supra note 32, at 126-30.
76
Id. at 133-35.
77
WEBBER, supra note 3, at 214-20.
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generous public sector pensions are too much of a drain on the public fisc.78
Although the recent bull market has buoyed many public-sector pension funds,
a crash would likely put many funds underwater—raising concerns about their
continuing viability.79
Funds like CalPERS will continue to be important players—both because of
the size of California and its government, as well as the lack of hostility towards
public-sector unions in that state. But even in California, an ongoing stream of
ballot initiatives proposes an end to defined-benefit plans for public
employees.80 Stasis would seem to be the best possible outcome—and stasis may
be optimistic.
C.

The Diminishing Power of Political Advocacy

Unions have significant political power in the United States—as an interest
group, they have no equal when it comes to worker advocacy. But even though
unions provide significant financial and manpower support to political
campaigns, their funding is ultimately dwarfed by funding from Wall Street.
Corporate leaders and financiers provide significantly more money to political
campaigns than do unions.81 In fact, a relatively small number of families have
provided a huge chunk of the overall political donations.82 Battling these titans
of modern capital is a losing proposition.
The federal government’s campaign-funding regime regulates union political
activity in much the same way as it regulates the activity of corporations.83 So,
just as Citizens United v. FEC84 allowed for corporate political spending on
individual campaigns, the case also allows for new possibilities for unions.85
78

Id. at 221-25; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Address, Is Bankruptcy the Answer for
Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1084 (2013) (discussing “unsustainable
pension promises”).
79
See WEBBER, supra note 3, at 226-27 (discussing debate about underfunding of public
pensions).
80
Id. at 222-23 (discussing proposed act to “change the California constitution to end
defined-benefit pension plans for all California public employees hired on or after January 1,
2019”).
81
Jamieson & Blumenthal, supra note 4.
82
Nicholas Confessore, Sarah Cohen & Karen Yourish, The Families Funding the 2016
Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2015/10/11/us/politics/2016-presidential-election-super-pac-donors.html (“These donors’
fortunes reflect the shifting composition of the country’s economic elite. . . . Most built their
own businesses, parlaying talent and an appetite for risk into huge wealth: They founded
hedge funds in New York, bought up undervalued oil leases in Texas, made blockbusters in
Hollywood.”).
83
Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech
Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (noting that “Citizens United also applies to
labor unions, freeing them to spend general treasury funds on electioneering”).
84
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
85
See id. at 324; Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political
Speech: A Response to Professor Sachs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 206, 207 (2012) (“The
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However, unions face an additional set of federal and constitutional restrictions
on their freedom as political actors that do not encumber corporations. Unlike
corporations, unions cannot spend on politics whatever they have in their
treasury. In a series of cases interpreting both the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”)
and the NLRA, the Supreme Court held that unions cannot require objecting
nonmembers to pay for costs outside those incurred in collective bargaining.86
Outside of states with right-to-work provisions, unions may require both
members and nonmembers to pay for the union’s costs of representing the
bargaining unit.87 However, there are limitations on the types of expenses that
can be charged to nonmembers. Objecting nonmembers must only pay their
portion of those expenses that were “necessarily or reasonably incurred for the
purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees
in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.”88 Political spending
is the quintessential type of expenditure that cannot be charged to objectors.89
This line of jurisprudence requiring a separation between collectivebargaining expenses and “unrelated” expenses has been roundly attacked by
legal academia.90 Much of the commentary has focused on statutory
interpretation and congressional intent, arguing that Congress did not mean to
curtail the union’s political activity.91 But on a broader level, the notion that
political spending is somehow external or superfluous to the core representation
obligation is misguided. Unions need to lobby to protect their institutional
interests, just as corporations often engage in extensive lobbying in order to

Citizens United decision opened up the potential for corporations and unions to give unlimited
amounts of money in support of politicians and their campaigns for office.”).
86
See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 763 (1988); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry.,
Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Emps., 466 U.S. 435, 455
(1984); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-70 (1961).
87
NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744-45 (1963) (permitting “agency shop”
agreements whereby unions charge nonmembers for the costs of collective representation).
88
Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448.
89
Beck, 487 U.S. at 740 (finding that objectors need not participate in “the union’s
expenditure of their fees on activities such as . . . lobbying for labor legislation, and
participating in social, charitable, and political events”); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 367 U.S.
at 766-69 (construing statute as “not vesting the unions with unlimited power to spend exacted
money”).
90
See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National
Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 103-18 (1990) (criticizing Court’s interpretation of NLRA in Beck);
George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 230 (1994) (stating that there is “much to criticize” when
discussing Beck); Charles R. Virginia, Comment, Communications Workers v. Beck:
Supreme Court Throws Unions Out on Street, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 665, 666 (1989)
(concluding that Court’s interpretation of NLRA was “flawed”).
91
See, e.g., Beck, 487 U.S. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
holding “simply cannot be derived from the plain language of the statute”); Dau-Schmidt,
supra note 90, at 74-76 (arguing that Court’s decision ran contrary to congressional intent).
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further their corporate objectives.92 Given the pervasive and fluctuating schemes
of government regulation, it would be foolhardy for companies not to be
engaged in the political process.93 The same logic arguably applies even more
to unions, whose business is subject to intense regulation. Such regulation plays
a role even outside the core provisions of the NLRA; state law covers such
critical topics as right-to-work status, public-sector unionization, and the
regulation of public demonstrations.94 Recent anti-labor efforts in Michigan and
Wisconsin show what can happen when unions lose political support at the state
level.95
Public-sector unions now face a more existential threat after Janus v.
American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees.96 Finding that
all activities of public-sector unions related to matters of public interest, the
Court ruled that unions cannot negotiate with state governments for the
collection of dues at any level without the permission of individual workers.97
In essence, the Court held that the Constitution requires that all public-sector
employment be right-to-work.98 Up until summer 2018, the Court had held that
unions could bargain for the automatic collection of dues for expenses-related
collective bargaining, while employees could opt out of non-collectivebargaining expenses such as political donations.99 At this point, states still allow
workers to opt out of collective-bargaining fees entirely and still be represented.
Although this dynamic may change, the Janus decision has, at the very least,
made it harder for unions to raise funds under traditional and settled mechanisms

92
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 147-48 n.46 (2003) (“Labor and business leaders
believe—based on experience and with good reason—that such access gives them an
opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives
from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties.” (quoting McConnell
v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 498 (D.D.C. 2003))), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010); Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2005) (“[C]orporate demand for political activity is a natural
response to the effect of legal rules on business operations.”).
93
Fisch, supra note 92, at 1570 (“Regulation has become an important factor for U.S.
businesses. As a result, corporate political activity must be integrated within a corporation’s
overall business strategy, and corporations need to develop and manage their political capital
in the same way that they manage other business assets.”).
94
Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 38, 38-42 (Phanindra V.
Wunnava ed., Routledge 2015).
95
Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty
Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511, 532-36 (2013).
96
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
97
Id. at 2478.
98
See id.
99
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223-24 (1977) (finding agency shop
clauses authorizing unions to automatically collect dues from nonmember public employees
constitutionally valid), overruled by Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S.
Ct. 2448 (2018).
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such as union security fees.100 There is even some speculation that the Court
might next turn to collective-bargaining fees in the private sector.101
III. LABOR AND CORPORATE POWER
We can no longer expect collective bargaining to empower most American
workers. That model no longer works. We need a new system of corporate
empowerment that puts workers directly at the center of firm governance. At the
same time, however, we must recognize that unions are the primary institutional
bulwark for workers’ economic and political power in the United States, with
decades of negotiating, legal, and political experience in getting workers a better
deal. Unions will still retain a critical role in our economic ecosystem, even if
we radically change our approach to worker power. This Part offers a
preliminary sketch of how this transition may work.
A.

Worker Power Within the Firm

The ultimate goal for worker empowerment should be participating in the
governance structure of the business. Even though labor and equity contributors
are the two primary sets of ongoing participants in the economic firm, firms are
generally governed solely by equity.102 Employees should have governance
rights that provide access to, engagement with, and some degree of control over
the management of the business. The most obvious example of a robust set of
participatory governance structures is Germany’s system of codetermination.
Codetermination requires that employees at large companies choose 50% of the
company’s supervisory board.103 The supervisory board is akin to the U.S.
corporation’s board of directors, in that both play primary roles in choosing the
company’s upper management and making organizational decisions such as
mergers, acquisitions, and dissolution. Shareholders elect the other 50% of
supervisory board members, and the board’s otherwise nonvoting chair has the

100
Alana Semuels, Is This the End of Public-Sector Unions in America?, ATLANTIC (June
27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janus-afscme-public-sectorunions/563879/ [https://perma.cc/2QCM-2MU8].
101
Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Janus Ruling Could Undercut Private Sector Unions Too, CHI.
TRIB., July 10, 2018, at C1.
102
For further discussion of the role of the employee within the economic firm, see
Matthew T. Bodie, Employment As Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 830-36 (2017).
103
Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 174-75 (Margaret M. Blair
& Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). The 50% requirement applies to companies with more than 2,000
employees. Companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees must have 30% employee
representation on the supervisory board. See Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, The German
System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 178 (Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 3d ed.
2017).
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tie-breaking vote.104 Recently, two bills have proposed American versions of
codetermination, in which employee representatives would serve on corporate
boards of directors. The Accountable Capitalism Act, proposed by Senator (and
presidential candidate) Elizabeth Warren, would require companies with more
than $1 billion in average revenue to have employees select at least 40% of the
seats on the board.105 Senator Tammy Baldwin has authored the Reward Work
Act, which proposes that one-third of directors be selected directly by
employees.106 Both of these proposals reflect the work of progressive corporate
law scholars who have advocated for more direct employee involvement in
corporate governance.107
Putting employee representatives onto boards of directors would give workers
real power within the corporation, and it would avoid many of the problems that
inhere in a system that relies solely on collective bargaining. With workers in
power on the board, they would have a say in all issues relating to the firm—not
just those issues related to their own terms and conditions of employment. The
benefits of this expanded scope would be two-fold. First, workers would have
more power to steer the corporation’s “entrepreneurial” decisions (such as
mergers and acquisitions, new product lines, and advertising) in ways that look
out for their own interests. Second, corporations would get the benefit of
employee expertise at the director level.108 Giving employees a voice in
corporate governance will completely shift our current oligarchical approach

104
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 103, at 178. One notable exception to this
structure is Volkswagen, in which the German state of Lower Saxony also was given seats on
the supervisory board, giving workers de facto control. JACK EWING, FASTER, HIGHER,
FARTHER: THE VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL 57 (2017).
105
Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6(b)(1) (2018).
106
Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018).
107
See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 16 (1995) (arguing that boards of directors
should take into account the effects of their decisions on all of the corporation’s stakeholders,
including employees); Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45
STETSON L. REV. 69, 84-89 (2015) (advocating for corporate governance reform to provide
employees with larger voice); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39
B.C. L. REV. 283, 287 (1998) (“[W]orkers should have some kind of representation on the
board of directors or have some role in electing directors, and . . . directors of companies
should be held to have some kind of fiduciary duties to workers in the employ of their firm.”);
Robert Hockett, Why (Only) ESOPs?, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 84, 85 (2006) (arguing for a
broader approach to the “ownership society” through employee ownership); Brett H.
McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 429, 429-30 (2011) (discussing possible strategies for creating a role for employees in
corporate governance).
108
See Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The Case
for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
871, 898-913 (2007) (discussing insights provided by employee input about board-level
corporate decisionmaking).
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and will open up the possibility of greater synergy between employers and
employees.109
Employee board representation would change, but not obviate, the role of
unions within the workplace. Board representation would provide employees
with a platform from which to build a stronger position within company
governance. Unions could play an important role in working with employees to
develop the expertise and strategies necessary to play their new supervisorial
role. Labor organizations have already worked closely with shareholder
advocacy groups in promoting corporate governance reform; board
representation would enable these groups to work even more closely together in
pursuing their joint interests of firm wealth maximization and managerial
oversight.110 Further, board representation would lead naturally to some version
of collective bargaining, as management—still controlled by shareholders under
Senators Warren’s and Baldwin’s proposals—would need to establish workers’
terms and conditions of employment. With employee board representation, labor
will feel less like a cost to be managed and more like part of the team to be
included. Board representation will facilitate union influence, not replace it. It is
not surprising that labor leaders have supported it.111
Complementary reforms could also help ensure a more robust role for unions
on the traditional shop-floor level. Germany is one of several European countries
that provide for works councils—firm-level or worksite-level organizations that
consult with management on issues of day-to-day employment.112 As standalone bodies, works councils give employees more voice, but they provide little
power, as they cannot negotiate on behalf of workers and generally are not
empowered to change corporate policy.113 But as part of a larger framework of
worker empowerment, works councils could allow workers—with the expertise
and experience of unions—to translate the governance power into concrete
results in workers’ daily lives.

109
For a discussion of innovative managerial structures that provide for more employee
empowerment, see LALOUX, supra note 12, at 55-61; ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 16-31.
110
See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 60, at 1023 (claiming that “much union-shareholder
activity represents an alignment of shareholder and worker interests that attempts to prod
management to increase the overall worth of the firm”).
111
Jake Johnson, To Curb Capitalism’s Toxic Impacts, Warren Unveils Plan to Give
Workers More Control Over Corporate Decisions, COMMON DREAMS (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2018/08/15/curb-capitalisms-toxic-impacts-warrenunveils-plan-give-workers-more-control-over [https://perma.cc/Q5WL-HA82] (“Applauding
Warren’s new bill in a tweet on Wednesday, AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka declared,
‘It’s time to rewrite the rules so our economy works for working people, not just those at the
top.’”).
112
ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 25.
113
Some U.S. companies have used versions of works councils that do in fact have de
facto power within the internal hierarchy. See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699,
701-02 (2001) (describing de facto power of one such set of internal committees).
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Collective bargaining has a rich history and proud tradition within our
economic framework. However, time has shown that it cannot subsist on its own.
Most labor advocates have pushed for more of the same when it comes to laborlaw reform—changes that make it easier for unions to represent more workers.114
In my view, we need reform at the corporate level to expect the dynamics to
shift.115 Unions will play a critical role not only in advocating for this shift, but
also in translating employee governance power into worker economic gains.
B.

Worker Power Across Firms

If workers are given more power within firms, then that power will become
more contested. Specifically, there is significant potential for workers to fight
among themselves when they have a voice in critical corporate decisions.116
Hierarchies and markets will continue to cause certain professions and
occupations to hold greater economic power than others. Unions have played,
and will play, an important role in providing collective market power not just to
workers as an undifferentiated whole, but also to specific groups of workers who
engage in particular types of jobs. As employees get more power within firms,
unions should provide more collective power for subsets of employees across
firms as a counterbalance to firm and industry power.
Many unions are already fulfilling this role of a professional- or occupationaltrade association. It is the old American Federation of Labor model—unions
represent particular trades and crafts, rather than employer-wide wall-to-wall
industrial units.117 A more trade- or occupational-oriented union movement
would have several advantages moving forward. First, different unions would
be better positioned to represent separate groups of employees within a
corporation. Rather than expecting one union to represent the needs of a
variegated set of workers, unions representing a particular occupation would
better know the needs of that occupation and could provide informed advice
about the issues that come up at the workplace. Second, these organizations
would have a message for employees across the nation: join us as part of your
professional and occupational identity. Just as attorneys have the American Bar
114
See, e.g., ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 6-8; GETMAN, supra note 58, at 257301 (arguing for reforms aimed at improving efficient organization of unions).
115
Matthew T. Bodie, The Next Iteration of Progressive Corporate Law, 74 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 739, 764-65 (2017) (“The progressive corporate law agenda must include changes to
the statutory structure that would better accomplish the distribution of power within the
firm.”).
116
The internecine warfare at United Airlines in the 1990s between flight attendants,
mechanics, and pilots provides one example. See Christopher Mackin, United It Was Not,
OWNERSHIP ASSOCIATES (Jan. 1, 2003), https://www.ownershipassociates.com/united.shtm
(“There are not many industries that are more occupationally segregated than the airline
industry.”).
117
See ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 26, at 36-39 (discussing the differences between
the craft-based approach of the American Federation of Labor and the industrial-oriented
approach of the Congress of Industrial Organizations).
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Association and mechanical engineers have the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, unions could adapt themselves to serve not only as collectivebargaining representatives, but also networks of continuing education,
vocational identity, and political advocacy. Members of the occupation could
join the union even if they were not represented, providing another source of
funds for the organizations that could be earmarked for lobbying and campaign
donations.118 Third, unions would be in a better position to aim for sectoral
bargaining—bargaining with all of the employers in a particular sector. Sectoral
bargaining has received significant attention as a new direction in labor law
reform, and a guild-oriented approach would provide unions with a weightier
argument to represent a set of workers across the sector.119
A specific occupational focus would also enable unions to use their pension
funds more effectively in support of their membership. An ongoing dilemma for
union leadership at pension funds is how to balance the plan’s need to maximize
wealth for its beneficiaries with leadership’s desire to advance the interests of
union members past, present, and future. Webber argues eloquently for the
possibility of a combined approach, where the fund pursues opportunities that
do not actively depress wages or encourage outsourcing while still pursuing
profitable investment strategies.120 But a fund focused on a particular type of
employee—and one that may even allow buy-in from members who are not
within bargaining units—may have a stronger argument that it needs to follow
the mission of the overall organization. A fund sponsored by the Carpenters
Union should be able to say that it will invest its funds in a way that benefits its
membership. Examples of programmatic investing include the Union Labor Life
Insurance Company, which invests in jobs-related investment funds, and the
National Electrical Benefit Fund, which serves as an investment manager for the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.121 Pension funds could join
together for pro-worker and pro-shareholder initiatives, while at the same time
pursuing investments that would benefit their own particular members. Care
would need to be taken to avoid nepotism, kickbacks, or pet political projects.122
But there is a wide range of potential investments that avoid these pitfalls while
still pursuing the interests of the organization as a whole.
118

An occupational or professional orientation would open up the possibility of nonemployee associations for independent contractors. One such example is the Dramatists
Guild, which provides model contracts and negotiating advice to dramatists and playwrights.
See Matthew T. Bodie, Lessons from the Dramatists Guild for the Platform Economy, 2017
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 17, 20-22 (2017). A more recently-created example is the Uber Guild, which
provides Uber drivers with driving advice and a forum for the expression of workplace-related
concerns. For a discussion of the pros and cons on nontraditional representation strategies
such as the Uber Guild, see Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the
Modern Economy, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1765-82 (2018).
119
ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 26-33; ROLF, supra note 28, at 37-44.
120
WEBBER, supra note 3, at 197-98.
121
Id. at 246-47.
122
Id. at 195.
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Worker Power in Society

Worker power within corporate governance would change two important
dynamics in our current political firmament. First, managers and shareholders
would not be free to use corporate funds to assist political parties or candidates
who seek to attack worker power and rights. FedEx, for example, has lobbied
assiduously to escape labor-oriented regulation.123 If worker representatives
were on the FedEx board, those directors could prevent, or at least frustrate, the
use of company funds for anti-worker efforts. Second, worker representation
would likely cut into the income inequality generated when management and
capital control the operation of the business.124 Workers would be signficantly
better positioned to demand higher compensation and object to excessive
compensation for executives, shareholders (through buybacks), and outside
consultants, investment bankers, and attorneys. Workers’ representatives would
have the market, moral, and governance authority to actually question why the
CEO has a golden parachute, why stock buybacks are not accompanied by wage
increases, and why a fancy law firm is getting $1,000 an hour for its services.
The reduction in income inequality would mean that founders, shareholders, and
executives have smaller pools of wealth from which to draw. This would leave
them with less money for, among other things, political donations. Certainly,
other steps to address the huge campaign funding gap—such as additional
campaign finance reform or a wealth tax—would have an even stronger effect.
But a return to the income distributions of the 1950s would mean that staggering
wealth would not be able to play the same role in our politics that it does today.
Within this new political ecosystem, unions would still have a vital role. As
suggested above, they would individually represent the interests of their
memberships—workers who share a particular occupation or profession. They
would be joined, on some matters, by the companies in their industry; for
example, a nurses’ union could jointly advocate with hospitals to secure more
funding for health care, nursing home care, or medical research—funding that
helps both employers and employees.125 But at other times, when nurses’
interests are in conflict with hospitals, they would advocate separately. One can
imagine this dynamic playing out against a wide variety of issues: each one will
create a new kaleidoscope of different players supporting, opposing, or horsetrading on the issue with other worker and industry groups. But when worker
board representatives bring better balance to corporate and capitalist political

123

See Fisch, supra note 92, at 1538-47 (highlighting FedEx’s attempts to argue its status
as “exempt from the NLRA” and its regulation); Frank N. Wilner, RLA or NLRA? FedEx and
UPS Follow the Money Trail, FED. LAW., Jan. 2010, at 40, 40.
124
See Bodie, supra note 107, at 88-89.
125
ANDY STERN, A COUNTRY THAT WORKS: GETTING AMERICA BACK ON TRACK 72 (2006)
(discussing how SEIU Local 1199 worked with its political supporters in the state government
to win “billions of dollars of reimbursements for the hospitals, which translated into stable
balance sheets for the employers and excellent wages and the gold standard of benefits for
hospital workers, including multi-million dollar training and upgrading funds for workers”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3641578

2019]

LABOR INTERESTS AND CORPORATE POWER

1149

spending, unions will be freed from the burden of representing all workers, in
all ways and at all times, through their political activity.
CONCLUSION
Our current system of collective bargaining is beset with endemic flaws that
make it unrealistic to expect a return to the labor union heydays of the 1950s.
Attempting to restore union glory solely through labor-law reforms would be a
Sisyphean task. We can only break through if we provide workers with power
directly in the governance of their firms. That power is critical to providing
unions with the ability to represent a broader swath of workers, build strong and
coherent organizations from within, and fill roles in the political ecosystem
consistent with their organizational identities. Corporate power for workers is
the surest route to protecting labor’s interests.
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